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- # Backport of the match_hostname logic introduced in python 3.2
- # http://hg.python.org/releasing/3.3.5/file/993955b807b3/Lib/ssl.py
- import re
- class CertificateError(ValueError):
- pass
- def _dnsname_match(dn, hostname, max_wildcards=1):
- """Matching according to RFC 6125, section 6.4.3
- http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
- """
- pats = []
- if not dn:
- return False
- parts = dn.split(r'.')
- leftmost = parts[0]
- remainder = parts[1:]
- wildcards = leftmost.count('*')
- if wildcards > max_wildcards:
- # Issue #17980: avoid denials of service by refusing more
- # than one wildcard per fragment. A survey of established
- # policy among SSL implementations showed it to be a
- # reasonable choice.
- raise CertificateError(
- "too many wildcards in certificate DNS name: " + repr(dn))
- # speed up common case w/o wildcards
- if not wildcards:
- return dn.lower() == hostname.lower()
- # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 1.
- # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in which
- # the wildcard character comprises a label other than the left-most label.
- if leftmost == '*':
- # When '*' is a fragment by itself, it matches a non-empty dotless
- # fragment.
- pats.append('[^.]+')
- elif leftmost.startswith('xn--') or hostname.startswith('xn--'):
- # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 3.
- # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier
- # where the wildcard character is embedded within an A-label or
- # U-label of an internationalized domain name.
- pats.append(re.escape(leftmost))
- else:
- # Otherwise, '*' matches any dotless string, e.g. www*
- pats.append(re.escape(leftmost).replace(r'\*', '[^.]*'))
- # add the remaining fragments, ignore any wildcards
- for frag in remainder:
- pats.append(re.escape(frag))
- pat = re.compile(r'\A' + r'\.'.join(pats) + r'\Z', re.IGNORECASE)
- return pat.match(hostname)
- def match_hostname(cert, hostname):
- """Verify that *cert* (in decoded format as returned by
- SSLSocket.getpeercert()) matches the *hostname*. RFC 2818 and RFC 6125
- rules are followed, but IP addresses are not accepted for *hostname*.
- CertificateError is raised on failure. On success, the function
- returns nothing.
- """
- if not cert:
- raise ValueError("empty or no certificate")
- dnsnames = []
- san = cert.get('subjectAltName', ())
- for key, value in san:
- if key == 'DNS':
- if _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
- return
- dnsnames.append(value)
- if not dnsnames:
- # The subject is only checked when there is no dNSName entry
- # in subjectAltName
- for sub in cert.get('subject', ()):
- for key, value in sub:
- # XXX according to RFC 2818, the most specific Common Name
- # must be used.
- if key == 'commonName':
- if _dnsname_match(value, hostname):
- return
- dnsnames.append(value)
- if len(dnsnames) > 1:
- raise CertificateError("hostname %r "
- "doesn't match either of %s"
- % (hostname, ', '.join(map(repr, dnsnames))))
- elif len(dnsnames) == 1:
- raise CertificateError("hostname %r "
- "doesn't match %r"
- % (hostname, dnsnames[0]))
- else:
- raise CertificateError("no appropriate commonName or "
- "subjectAltName fields were found")
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